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Abstract
In spite of the very common opinion we show that QM is not com-
plete and that it is possible to create prequantum models providing
finer description of physical reality than QM. There exists (at least
in theoretical models) dispersion free states and the Heisenberg un-
certainty principle can be violated. Thus in spite of all “No-Go”
theorems (e.g., von Neumann, Kochen and Specker,..., Bell) we found
a realist basis of quantum mechanics. I think that our model would
totally satisfy A. Einstein who was sure that QM is not complete and
a finer description is possible.
Our representation is not standard model with hidden variables. In par-
ticular, this is not a reduction of the quantum model to the classical one.
Moreover, we see that such a reduction is even in principle impossible. This
impossibility is not the consequence of a mathematical theorem but it fol-
lows from the physical structure of the model. By our model quantum states
are very rough images of domains in the space of fundamental parameters
- PRESPACE. Those domains represent complexes of physical conditions.
By our model both classical and quantum physics describe REDUCTION
of PRESPACE-INFORMATION. As we have already mentioned, QM is not
complete. In particular, there are prespace contexts which can be only rep-
resented by a so called hyperbolic quantum model.
1. “Classical” and “quantum” probabilities. The starting point of
our considerations was the comparative analysis of so called classical and
quantum probabilities. Such an analysis was performed in my book [1]
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and it demonstrated that, in fact, there are no “classical” and “quantum”
probabilities. To understand the probabilistic foundations of QM in the right
way we should forget about such funny (and totally meaningless) ideas as,
e.g., irreducible quantum randomness. Instead of repeating that quan-
tum and classical (in some versions micro and macro) worlds are described by
totally different probabilistic calculi, we should find the conventional prob-
abilistic roots of so called “quantum probabilities”. To find such roots we
should start with the most fundamental distinguishing feature of quantum
probabilities, namely with interference of probabilities.
2. Interference of probabilities. There is the common opinion (e.g.,
see Feynman’s book on path integrals) that there is crucial difference be-
tween classical and quantum probabilistic rules for addition of probabilities
of alternatives:
P = P1 + P2 (1)
and
P = P1 + P2 + 2
√
P1P2 cos θ. (2)
However, in 2001 I demonstrated that so called quantum rule for interference
of probabilities can be easily derived, see, e.g. [2], by using the frequency
von Mises approach to probability — probability as the limit of relative fre-
quencies for a collective (random sequence). Thus there is no contradiction
between the classical frequency probability theory and quantum probability
theory. Quantum probability theory can be considered as a very special do-
main of the “classical” frequency probability theory. Quantum probabilistic
domain is a proper domain of “classical” frequency probability the-
ory. It was found [2] that beside of quantum-like trigonometric interference
(2) we can obtain hyperbolic interference:
P = P1 + P2 ± 2
√
P1P2 cosh θ. (3)
3. Contextual theory of probability. Our derivation of interference
of probabilities is based only on one postulate:
Contextuality of probabilities: Probabilities depend on complexes of
physical conditions.
We call complexes of physical conditions – (physical) contexts and prob-
ability models based on this postulate – contextual probabilistic models.
In particular, the frequency probability model of von Mises is, in fact, a
contextual probabilistic model where contexts are represented by collectives.
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But R. von Mises did not pay attention to the contextual aspect of his model
and therefore he did not find formulas (2), (3).
Recently [3] it was observed that by using the contextual interpretation
of the conventional Kolmogorov model we can also obtain the interference of
probabilities.
Conclusion: Interference of probabilities is not rigidly coupled with QM.
Interference is a consequence of contextuality of probabilities.
If you like we propose a probabilistic formalization of ideas of N. Bohr that
the whole experimental arrangement should be always taken into account.
Unfortunately N. Bohr never did this by himself. He was mainly concentrated
on so called individual phenomena (see [4] on an extended analysis of views
of N. Bohr), i.e., individual contextuality. We are speaking about statistical
contextuality.
4. Contextually sensitive random variables. Of course, nontrivial
interference of probabilities can arise only for very special pairs a, b of random
variables, namely random variables which are sensitive to perturbations of
contexts produced by measurements. Let C be a context. We call the pair
of (conventional, e.g. Kolmogorovian) random variables a, b contextually
sensitive if the probability distribution for results of a measurement of the
random variable b in the context C differs from its probability distribution
for results of a measurement performed in a new context C
a
. The latter
context is created by combination of in the original context C and the context
corresponding to a measurement of a (e.g., filtration with respect of values
of a). So the variable b is sensitive to changes of a context C induced by
measurement of a and vice versa. The cos θ and cosh θ in formulas (2) and
(3) give the measure of statistical perturbation induced by perturbation of
context.
We underline that we speak not about perturbations of physical systems
induced by measurements but by changes of complexes of physical conditions.
Thus contextually sensitive random variables need not be Heisenbergian.
It seems that N. Bohr in his famous reply to A. Einstein on the EPR-
paradox tried to explain that physical observables under consideration are
contextually sensitive. Unfortunately N. Bohr was sure that QM is complete.
5. Quantum-like probabilistic models. Since to get quantum-like
interference of probabilities we use only contextuality of probability and no
“really quantum features” it would be natural to suppose that such an in-
terference can be found not only in experiments with microsystems, but in
other experiments in which we measure contextually sensitive random vari-
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ables. In [5] it was conjectured that quantum-like probabilistic behaviour
might be observed in experiments with cognitive systems. The main moti-
vation was that cognitive systems are very complex information systems and
mental observables are extremely sensitive to perturbations of context. This
conjecture was confirmed by a series of psychological experiments [6]. Re-
cently quantum-like behaviour of probabilities was also found in some games
[7].
6. Hilbert space representation of a contextual Kolmogorov
model. Starting with the formula for interference of probabilities we con-
structed a Hilbert space representation of a contextual Kolmogorov model
It was shown that for a Kolmogorov probability space K = (Ω,F ,P) and
a pair of incompatible Kolmogorovian random variables b and a we can con-
struct a natural quantum representation. This representation is rigidly based
on a pair of variables b and a — fundamental (for that concrete represen-
tation of physical reality) observables. In particular, the standard quantum
representation is based on the position and momentum observables.
7. Prespace. Points of Ω are interpreted as fundamental physical pa-
rameters1. We call Ω prespace and fundamental parameters — prepoints.
The main distinguishing feature of the representation map is the huge
compression of information. In particular, every point represented in
the conventional mathematical model of physical space by a vector x ∈ R3
is the image of a subset
B
x
= {ω ∈ Ω : b(ω) = x}
of Ω which can contain millions of prepoints. In the conventional quantum
representation of the prespace the fundamental variable b = q is the position
observable.
8. Classical probability and classical physics. There is again
a rather common tendency to identify classical probability and classical
physics. This is totally wrong idea.
Classical physics provides the description of some physical phenomena
by using Newtonian (or Hamiltonian) mechanics and the model R3 for the
“physical space” and R for the time, where R is the real line. So impos-
sibility of classical description of some phenomena should be considered as
1If you like HV... But the general HV-approach was so discredited by former investi-
gations (since people wanted too much for such a HV-description) that we would not like
even to refer to HV.
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impossibility to embed such phenomena in the Newtonian R3-model (with
continuous real time). And if we read carefully N. Bohr and W. Heisen-
berg we understand immediately that they had in mind precisely this idea
on the impossibility of classical reduction of QM. However, later (mainly
due to efforts of quantum logic and Bellian community) classical description
was identified with classical probabilistic description. This induces the above
mentioned view:
classical probability iff classical physics.
As we have already pointed out quantum probabilistic calculus can be
obtained in the classical (but contextual) probabilistic framework. More-
over, quantum probabilistic calculus can successfully used in some classical
physical models [8].
However, the existence of a prequantum classical probabilistic model does
not imply the reduction of quantum physics to classical. In our model it is
impossible to imbed quantum phenomena in Newtonian model in the physical
space. There exist physical contexts which could not be described by using
the physical space coordinates. Such contexts can be represented only by
vectors of a Hilbert space.
Thus our approach is totally in accordance with views of N. Bohr and W.
Heisenberg. However, I think that we should say ”Farewell” to the physical
R3-space and not to classical probability.
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